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Abstract. We define an ESS to be a set of strategies (a coalition) which can persist 
together through time and which are resistant to invasion by rare alternative 
strategies. In spite of large fluctuations in population density and relatively small 
fluctuations in strategy frequencies, we show that the evolutionary game will still 
produce a well-defined coalition of strategies as an ESS. Since population fluctuations 
are endemic properties of ecosystems, it is significant that although such fluctuations 
may alter the strategies of the coalition, they do not preclude the existence of an ESS. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We have developed a new Evolutionarily Stable 
Strategy (ESS) definition (see Maynard Smith. 1982) 
to include continuous evolutionary games under 
both frequency- and density-dependent selection 
(Brown and Vincent, 1986). This definition 
incorporates the dynamics of the evolutionary 
process and allows the ESS to be a coalition of 
several coexisting strategies. This coalition must 
be resistant to invasion by any number of mutants 
(rare alternative strategies). 
We have previously required that the ESS produce 
both evolutionary and ecological stability. That 
is, both strategy frequencies and population 
densities achieve stable equilibria. Both empirical 
and theoretical works suggest that many 
populations may not tend toward asymptotically 
stable equilibrium points but rather may be 
characterized by limit cycles (Hassell et al., 
1976) or chaotic behavior such as a strange 
attractor (Gilpin, 1979; Schaffer, 1985). We relax 
both stability assumptions in this paper and 
develop the necessary conditions for such an ESS. 
Examples based on a Lokta-Volterra population 
growth equation and on an annual plant growth 
model will illustrate the existence of "well- 
behaved" ESS's, in spite of fluctuations in 
strategy frequencies and fluctuations in population 
densities. 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
This section presents a generalization of some of 
our previous results involving the ESS concept 
developed for continuous games (Vincent and Brown, 
1984; Brown and Vincent, 1986). The theory is 
generalized to include ESS's involving 
nonequilibrium population densities and/or strategy 
frequencies. 
The evolutionary game involves the actual 
frequency- and density-dependent selection 
occurring in natural populations. In the evolu- 
tionary game, the fitness of an individual organism 
is a function of both the number of other 
individuals and the strategies (heritable 
phenotypes) used by them. The outcome of an 
evolutionary game involves the persistence of 
strategies through time. 
Our mathematical model for an evolutionary game 
involves the following: 
1. An endless series of generations starting at t 
= 0 and continuing for t = 1, . . . . 
2. A strategy set U defined by 
u = (u l = 0 and h(u) (1) 
u = . . . is row vector and each 
Cg,(-1. . ..* %(*)I. n i m, and ht.1 = [h,(e). . . . . 
ho(*)]. q > 0. are C' functions of u. The notations 
='and>.apply to each component of g(u) and h(u), 
respe&ely. If there are no equality or 
inequality constraints, then U = Em. Any u E U 
will be referred to as a strategy vector. 
3. A finite population of players per unit area 
(i.e., density of players) Nft) who draw strateoies 
from-the strategy' set U.. Let Ni(t), i = 1, . . ..-r 5 
N(t). be the density from this population using 
distinct strategy vectors ui E U at generation t; 
Let the first g strategies, 1 2 0 I r. be 
designated by the row vector 
u' = [u', . . . . U"] (2) 
and the remaining r-0 strategies be designated by 
the row vector 
um = (uo+l. . . . . ur], (3) 
and let 6 be the row vector of all strategies 
present in the population 
6 = [UO. 01. (4) 
7bb 
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Furthermore, let 
and 
pi(t) = Ni(t)/N(t) (5) 
P(t) = (P,(t), ...B Pr(t)l. -(5) 
The row vector p(t) at any generation t must lie in 
the set P defined by 
P = {p 6 Erlp, + . . . + pr = 1 
and pi 2 0, i = 1, . . . . r). 
The following subset of P 
(7) 
Q = (p 6 Plpi # 0, i = 1, . . . . 0 
and pi = 0, i = otl , . . . . rl 
will also be of use in what follows. 
(91 
4. A set of positive C' average individual fitness 
functions Hi[& p(t), N(t)],i = 1, . . . . r. By defini- 
tion 
Ni(t+l) = Ni(t)Hi[G, p(t), N(t)]. (9) 
The number of strategy vectors r is generally much 
smaller than the number of players N(t) at any 
time t. 
To start the mathematical game, one can fix N(0) 
and let a random process choose r, ui 6 U, i = 1, 
. . . . r, and p(O) e P. The game proceeds from 
generation to generation by calculating the number 
of players using a given strategy in the next 
generation according to (9). Equation (9) may also 
be written in terms of frequencies 
Pi(t+l) = pi(t)Hi(i, P(t), N(t)l/fi(t) (10) 
where R(t) is the average fitness of the population 
R(t) = ii, Pi(t)Hf[;, o(t), N(t)1 (11) 
and the change in total density is given by 
N(t+l) = N(t)R(t). (12) 
The following definitions are formulated to 
incorporate the possibility that both the 
frequencies p(t) and the density N(t) may never 
approach equilibrium values. However. it is 
required that as t * =, both p(t) and N(t) cycle at 
some fixed but not necessarily equal time periods. 
The definitions also include the possibility of 
multiple mutants (i.e., new strategies introduced 
into an existing population) and a coalition (i.e., 
one or more strategies persisting together) of ESS 
strategies. 
Definition 1. A vector u" is said to be a 
coalition vector if for an integer generation gap 6 lim N(t) E N*(j) j 6 (1, . . . . 6) (22) 
21 there exists a set of densities t-m 
N*(j) > 0, j=l, 6, . . . . (13) 
a set of frequencies 
p*(j) ' 0, j=l , . . . . 6, (14) 
such that for all strategy vectors urn 6 U, for ali 
starting frequencies p(0) E 0, and for any j L (1, 
. . . . 6) the dynamics prescribed by (lo)-(12) yield 
for i = 1 . *... o and k = 2, . . . . 6 (provided 6 ) 1) 
ast-- 
p?(l) = p?(S)Wi[<, D*(6), N*(6)]Iq*(6) 
(15) 
p?(k) = pf(k-l)Hi[G, p*(k-1), N*(k-l)]/R*(k-1) 
and 
N*(l) = W*(a)A*(a) 
(16) 
N*(k) = N*(k-l)l?*(k-1) 
where 
(I* (j) = i;, p?(j)Wi(u, o*(j). N*(jll. (17) 
Note that a dual notation is used. Without a star, 
p(t) and N(t) refer to p and N evaluated at time t. 
With a star, o*(j) and N*(j) refer to specific 
values of p and Y. The 6 x r matrix of strategies 
p*(j), j = 1. . . . . 6, is called the strategy matrix 
s. and the 6 x 1 vector of densities N*(j), j = 1, 
. . . . 6, is called the density vector c. 
Note that if every row of 1 and every element of c 
are equal, then N*(j) and p*(j). j 6 (1, . . . . 6). are 
equilibrium points which are local attractors for 
the dynamical system, and the system is said to be 
stable. Otherwise, the system is unstable in the 
sense that periodic limit cycles exist. In order 
to satisfy Definition 1, the fitness functions must 
have the property that at zero frequency a 
strategy has no effect on the payoffs of others. 
The fraction of players using coalition strategies 
is given by 
P&t) = iil Pi(t) (18) 
and is called the coalition frequency. We define 
the average fitness of this-group of players as 
o Pi(t) 
)X(t) = 1 po Hi[u",um,o(t),N(t)]. (19) 
i=l 
It then follows from (10) and (12) that p0 will 
change from generation to generation according to 
pp(t+l) = p,(t)Q,(t)/A(t). (20) 
Oefinition 2. A local coalition vector u' is said 
to be an ESS if there exists a generation time 6 2 
0 such that for all urn c U, all p(0) E P-Q, and 
for any j E (1, . . . . 6) equation (20) yields a 
monotone increasing sequence for p,(t) when t = t,, 
t = t, + 6, t = t, + 26, . . . . for any t, 2 6 and 
;':", p(t) 6 p*(j) j E (1, . . . . 6) (21) 
Definition 3. At any time t, the following 
product of 6 fitness functions for a given player 
is called the compound fitness. 
6-1 
ni(t) = II HiLug p(t+j), N(t+j)l. (23) 
,=3 
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Likewise, the product of 6 average fitness 
functions 
6-l 
i(t) = n R(t+j) 
j=O 
is called the compound average fitness. 
.(24) 
The change in frequency for any strategy over the 
generation gap 6 may now be determined by 
pi(t+d) = pi(t)llilll. (25) 
Definition 4. A function G[u, <, p(t), N(t)] is 
said to be a generating function for the population 
if 
G[uis i. p(t). N(t)1 f HiCc, p(t). N(t)]- (26) 
The existence of a generating function makes it 
possible to derive relatively straightforward 
necessary conditions for determining an ESS. as 
provided in the following theorem. In this 
theorem, we need the following averaqe generatinq 
functions 
c*(j) = iil Pi(tlGCui. i. P*(j), N*(j)1 
(27) 
j=l * . . . . 6. 
Theorem. Let u” be a coalition vector with 
equilibrium frequencies s and equilibrium densities 
c. If u' is a local ESS for the balanced 
evolutionary game defined by a regular constraint 
set of the form (l), system dynamics (lo)-(12), and 
generating function (26). then there exists column 
vector multipliers A and p > 0 of the same 
dimension as the functions g(m) <nd h(a) such that 
for every j E (1. . . . . 0) and k = 2. . . . . 6 (provided 
6 > 1) 
P;(l) = P~(6)G[Uj,U.p*(6).N*(s)l/E*(6) 
(28) 
p;(k) = p;(k-l)G[uj,C,p*(k-l),N*(k-r)l/E*(k-1) 
N*(l) = N*(6)6*(6) 
N*(k) = N*(k-l)E*(k-1) 
(29) 
aL(d, uo, S, 1, F) 
au 
=o 
g(d) = 0 
h(uj) 2 0 
[h(uj)]u = 0 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
where 
6-1 
L(u,~.~,c,A,~) = n G[u,Wt+j).W+j)l 
j-0 
(34) 
+ rs(u)l~ + rh(u)ln 
replaced by uj, a component of the coalition vector 
UO. 
Proof. The proof follows using the methods of 
Brown and Vincent (1986). 
ESS'S WTH THE LOKTA-VOLTERRA MODEL 
The examples in this and the following section 
will serve to illustrate the use of the theorem, 
as well as to demonstrate the existence of ESS's 
in a nonequilibrium situation. 
Recall that pi(t) is the fraction of individuals in 
a population using the strategy ui at a current 
generation t. In what follows, assume that the 
strategies are unconstrained scalars (i.e., ui c 
E'). Further, assume that the fraction of 
individuals in the population using strategy ui in 
the next generation is given by the following 
Lokta-Volterra model: 
Ni(t+l) = Ni(t) + R 
E (35) -_ 
- # _il +f. 
j- 
ujlpj(t) 
where r is the number of strategies, R is a common 
intrinsic growth rate, K(ui) is the carrying 
capacity of an individual using strategy ui, and 
a(u', uJ) is the competitive effect of an individual 
using strategy uj on the fitness of an individual 
using strategy ,i. 
It follows from Definition 4 that a generating 
function for this model exists and is given by the 
term in brackets in (35) with ul replaced by u. 
For this problem, L(e) is just the generating 
function 
L[u, G, 1, c] = 1 + R 
(36) 
- z jl a(u, ujlpj(tl. 
If R 5 2, then for any fixed strategies the 
dynamics produced by (IO)-(12) yield a stable 
equilibrium point for N and p; that is. 6 = 1. For 
an ESS coalition of one (a = l), necessary 
conditions (28)-(29) yield 
G[u', ii, p*(l), N*(l)] = G*(l) = 1. (37) 
Thus, 
K(u') = N*(l)a(u', u'). (38) 
Applying the necessary condition (30) yields 
aK(u') 
P(U'. ul) 7 
ao(u' 0') 
= K(u') -+- . (39) 
Assume now that R = 0.25 and that the carrying 
capacity and competitive term are given by 
K(ui) = 100 exp[ 91 (40) 
and s is the vector urn with each component of urn 
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a(“‘, ,j) = 1 + exp[ ; [ui - ;j + 2]i/ 
L -1 - ewt ;T 1 * 
L _I 
Solving (38)-(41) yields u' = 1.213 and N*(l) = 
83.2. Figure 1 illustrates the result of using the 
ESS strategy u' along with the alternative 
strategy u1 = 0. The population using u1 is 
labeled N,, and the population using the 
alternative strategy is labeled N,. Both 
populations are driven by the dynamics (lo)-(12). 
Figure 2 illustrates the same results in terms Of 
frequency. The strategy u' = 0 is the strategy 
which maximizes the size and growth rate of the 
population as a whole. In other words, it is the 
value of u which maximizes Hi when u' and UJ are 
set equal to u. At such a noncompetitive 
equilibrium, a population of N, would have a higher 
density (N, = 100) than the ESS population of N, = 
83.2. This illustrates the fact that maximizing 
individual fitness under frequency-dependent 
selection does not necessarily maximize population 
size or fitness. 
Figures 1 and 2 represent different ways of 
looking at the same dynamics. Ecological (Figure 
1) and evolutionary (Figure 2) processes are not 
decoupled, in that the same fitness function drives 
both processes. However, as we shall see when we 
consider nonequilibrium evolution, one obtains a 
different impression from each process. 
Note that the rate of evolution, or the rate at 
which equilibrium is approached in Figure 1, seems 
"slow." After about 135 generations, the 
alternative strategy is still used by about 10% of 
the population. If a mutant strategy were chosen 
closer to the ESS, then the rate of evolution 
would be even slower, and it could take hundreds 
or even thousands of generations to approach 
equilibrium. 
Now consider increasing the intrinsic rate of 
growth to R = 2.1. In this case, there does not 
exist a stable equilibrium population density, but 
rather a two-point limit cycle is obtained. The 
L(u, li, 1, c) function for this case is given by 
uj)pj(t) 1 
I[ 
(42) 
RN(t+l) r +R-- 
K(u) 1 j=l 
O(U, uj)pj(t+l) 
I 
As before, we seek a single strategy ESS u' from 
the necessary conditions of the theorem. Applying 
(30) yields an expression with (39) as a factor. 
Thus, (39) is also necessary for a generation gap 
of two. Indeed, (39) is necessary for any 
generation gap 21. Since the ESS strategy is 
independent of,N*(l) and N*(Z), these densities are 
readily determined from (28) and (29) to yield 
N*(l) = 93.90 and N*(Z) = 68.53. Clearly, in this 
case, p*(l) = p*(2) = 0.5. 
FIG. 1. Population dynamics. 
FIG. 2. Frequency dynamics. 
If we assume the same functional forms for 
carrying capacity and competitive interactions and 
the same parameter values (save for the value of 
the intrinsic rate of growth, R), then the ESS is 
still qiven by u 1 = 1.213, reqardless of the value 
of the intrinsic rate of growth. Figure 3 plots 
the population densities using thP ES'S stratpqy, u' 
= 1.213, with the mutant strategv u' = 9. 
FIG. 3. Nonequilibrium nopulation dynamics. 
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On comparing the behavior of the ESS for the case 
of no fluctuations (Figure 1) to the case of 
fluctuating population densities (Figure 3). it is 
noted that the approach to equilibrium is much 
faster in the two-cycle case. If we were to--plot 
frequencies for the R = 2.1 case, they would plot 
similar to Figure 2 with a change in time scale. 
In other words, for both cases the frequency of 
the ESS increases asymptotically to one with no 
fluctuations. 
ESS'S WITH A PLANT MODEL 
Consider an annual plant in an environment with a 
fixed growing season of length T. IUp to some time 
period u (0 1. u 5 T), the plant devotes all of its 
resources to vegetative growth. At time u, the 
plant switches from vegetative growth to 
reproductive growth. If the switching time u is a 
trait determined by natural selection, then we may 
seek an ESS for u. 
Cohen (1971) introduced a model for a single plant 
in terms of u. The model presented here is a 
specific example based upon the general model 
developed by Vincent and Brown (1984). For 
brevity, we do not include here a discussion of the 
model's underlying assumptions. 
According to this model, seed production by the ith 
individual plant is given by 
S[ui,Gp(t),n(t)l = 
f(ui)(T-ui) 
i+W[u~,um,ui,p(t),N(t)l 
(43) 
where ,i is the switching trait of the ith 
individual and f(ui) is a function which relates ui 
to plant size and the capacity of the plant to 
produce seeds per unit time. The difference (t - 
u') is the time left in the growing season for seed 
production, and W(a) is the competitive effect on 
the rate of seed production by neighboring plants. 
In general, W(e) is a function of the flowering 
time of plant i, the flowering time of all other 
plants, and plant density. 
The fitness of an individual is determined by its 
seed production relative to the seed production of 
others. For this example, assume that the 
environment alternates between two year types, 
good and bad, which determine the number of 
available growth sites. Let (e) denote the 
argument [u, u, p(t), N(t)]! and let the generating 
function be given by 
G(.) = s(.)lo IZ-sWU+2t)W I 
NS(.) 
(44) 
where 
5(e) = ; pjS[uj, j, o(t), N(t)] . 
j=l 
(45) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (44) gives 
the number of available growth sites, which in 
turn causes the population density to oscillate 
between 10 and 1000. The generation gap, 
therefore, is 2, and the appropriate L(u. j, 7, c, 
P) function is formed by taking the product of (44) 
evaluated at, times t and t+l and adjoining the 
inequality constraints 
to obtain 
u>o 
(46) 
T-u,0 
L(.) = s[u,~,p(t),N(t)ls[u,~,p(t+l),N(t+l)l 
~[u,;,p(t),N(t)l~[u.~,p(t+l),N(t+l)l 
(47) 
+ n,u + IJ,(T - u) 
Necessary conditions (28)-(29) yield N(1) = 10 and 
N(2) = 1000. Condition (30) yields 
aS(ul, u*, 1, 10) 
au S(u', u'. 1. 1000) 
(48) 
+ aS(u*, u*, 1, 1000) 
au 
S(u', u', 1, 10) = 0. 
In particular, let 
T = 100 
f(ui) = exp(0.02ui) 
(49) 
(50) 
r 
Nui.,-.!NtlNtll = $ jjl pj(t)[t+uj-ui]uj. (51) 
For this case. condition (48) yields a globally 
stable ESS with u' = 59.9. Using this strategy 
along with two mutant strategies. u' = 57.7 and u' 
= 66.5, under the system dynamics (lo)-(12) and 
generating function (44) yields the frequency 
trajectories shown in Figure 4. The mutant 
strategies would be ESS strategies for this model 
if plant density were held at 10 and 1000, 
respectively. Note that all of the frequencies 
oscillate about a nominal path toward equilibrium. 
FIG. 4. An ESS with fluctuating frequencies. 
When the ESS is density dependent. as it is in this 
case, the value of the ESS is clearly different 
when the population density oscillates than when 
the population density is constant. However, the 
oscillating population densities do not preclude 
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the emergence of an ESS. In terms of the 
frequency trajectories, the qualitative behavior is 
the same for both the Lokta-Volterra and plant 
model. Note that in spite of the large density 
fluctuations (IO-lOOO), the fluctuations ,- in 
frequency are slight. This accounts for the 
different impressions one may have of an 
ecological process when viewed from a frequency or 
density perspective. 
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